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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-EFFECT OF ADVERTISING ON WARNING
GIVEN-Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183
(Ct. App. 1964).
Chloromycetin, the trade name for chloramphenicol, is a wide
spectrum antibiotic developed and exclusively manufactured by
Parke-Davis and Company. The drug was first presented on the
market in 1949. Three years after its introduction, the Food and
Drug Administration conducted an investigation into reports of
connection between the use of chloromycetin and aplastic anemia,'
a frequently fatal condition. The report by the Food and Drug
Administration stated that the connection established between
aplastic anemia and the drug was found to be sufficiently impor-
tant "' . . . to warrant a warning on the label, or packages of the
drug and the recommendation that chloramphenicol not be used
indiscriminately or for minor infections.'"2 A specified cautionary
warning for circulars or packages and labels was prescribed.3
Parke-Davis immediately complied with the Food and Drug Admin-
istration's directive as to labeling. In addition, letters were mailed
to 200,000 physicians, warning them of the dangers in the use of this
drug. Thereafter, Parke-Davis conducted an intensive advertising
and promotional campaign. This advertising "played down" the
dangers of the drug and gave assurances that "Side effects occur
infrequently with chloromycetin and, when encountered, are gen-
erally unusually -mild for this type of therapy. '4 In addition,
1 Aplastic anemia is defined in MALoY, MEDICAL'DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS
48 (3d ed. 1960), as ". .. a rare type of anemia in which bone marrow
cells do not manufacture white blood cells (leukocytes) in sufficient
numbers to equal their destruction."
2 Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 383, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 185 (Ct. App.
1964).
3 "(TO APPEAR AT TOP OF CIRCULAR)
"Certain blood dyscrasias (aplastic anemia, thrombocytopenic pur-
pura, granulocytopenia and pancytopenia) have been associated with
the administration of Chloromycetin. It is essential that adequate
blood studies be made when prolonged or intermittent administration
of this drug is required. Chloromycetin should not be used indiscrim-
inately or for minor infections.
"(ON THE LABEL)
"WARNING: Blood dyscrasias may be associated with intermit-
tent or prolonged use and it is essential that adequate studies be made."
Id. at n.2.
4 Id. at 398, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 195. From another adVertisement of Parke-
Davis came the statement: "' "In no case have we seen any evidence
of depression of the hemopoietic system resulting in aplastic anemia or
agranulocytosis. We are now certain that Chloromycetin is effective
with very minimal untoward side effects."' " Ibid.
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Parke-Davis's salesmen, called "detail" men, ". . . extolled the vir-
tues of chloromycetin, and minimized its dangers. ' 5
The plaintiff had been consulting the defendant doctor. In
September of 1958 she complained of a sore gum and the doctor
prescribed chloromycetin. In November of the same year, the doc-
tor again prescribed chloromycetin for the plaintiff, this time for
treatment of bronchitis. Neither of these conditions was serious
enough to warrant the prescription of this drug and on both occa-
sions the prescription was refilled several times. The plaintiff de-
veloped a condition which was diagnosed in the spring of 1959 as
aplastic anemia. The evidence showed that the doctor's prescrip-
tion of chloromycetin had been influenced by Parke-Davis's adver-
tising.
Plaintiff brought an action for damages against the prescribing
doctor, Parke-Davis and Company, and the pharmacist who filled
and refilled the prescription. While the jury's verdict was in favor
of the pharmacist, 6 the plaintiff recovered a judgment in the sum of
334,046 dollars against the doctor on the basis of negligence in pre-
scribing chloromycetin and against Parke-Davis on the basis of neg-
ligence in failing to give an adequate warning. This was reversed
on appeal 7 due to misconduct at the trial by the counsel for the
plaintiff. However, the California District Court of Appeal held
that there was substantial evidence to support the verdict against
each of these two defendants and a new trial was required against
them. The purpose of this article is to discuss the possible bases for
liability of the manufacturer in a case such as this.
I. NEGLIGENCE OF PARKE-DAVIS
Because the record failed to establish negligence in the manu-
facture of the drug and it showed that the drug was found uncon-
taminated,8 the court said that "negligence, if any, would have to
be predicated upon evidence that the company failed adequately to
warn of the dangers of its use."'9  The duty of manufacturers to
warn of latent dangers inherent in their products is well estab-
lished.'0
5 Id. at 399, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
6 Id. at 382 n.1, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 184 n.1.
7 Id. at 382, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
8 Id. at 394, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
9 Ibid.
10 For an excellent discussion of the duty to warn, see Dillard and Hart,
II, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA.
L. REv. 145 (1955).
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Prior to the decision in Love, the liability of manufacturers of
products which were non-negligently made, in the sense that they
contained no contaminants and were made as the manufacturer in-
tended, had been based either on the failure to adequately warn of
dangers inherent in the product" or the breach of either an im-
plied or an express warranty contained in advertising or promo-
tional material.12
Contrary to the cases holding the manufacturer liable for a
failure to adequately warn, the warning given in the literature sent
to the medical profession by Parke-Davis complied with the require-
ments of the Food and Drug Administration directive and, standing
alone, would have been adequate to warn of the dangers involved in
prolonged use of chloromycetin. But, since Parke-Davis had
"played down" the dangers originally warned against, the court in
Love held that a jury would be warranted in finding that they had
negligently caused the warning to be withdrawn or cancelled.' 3
While it is an established rule that "An assurance of safety, as
well as a failure to warn of danger, may be negligence,"'14 Love
appears to be the first decision to recognize that such assurances of
safety, in the form of advertising and promotional material and
statements, when rendered concurrent with or subsequent to a
warning, may cancel or withdraw the warning of danger. This re-
sult is both sound and logical. A warning given by a manufacturer
should not absolve the manufacturer of liability when the major
content of the advertisement which contains the warning is assur-
ance that the product is safe for use. Nor can the consumer be
expected to give proper heed to a warning from the manufacturer
when the manufacturer's personal representatives assure him that
new evidence indicates that the product is safe. In situations such
as these, the dominant impression given to the consumer is that the
goods are safe, and even though the required warning is contained
in the advertising or has been previously given, the manufacturer
has not adequately fulfilled his duty to warn of dangers inherent
in the use of his product.
11 E.g., Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1963); Spruill
v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); Tingey v. E. F.
Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179 P.2d 807 (1947).
12 E.g., Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 30 Ohio Op. 2d 181, 197 N.E.2d
921 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964) aff'd 3 Ohio St.2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965);
Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961); Baxter v. Ford
Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
13 Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 400, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 196 (Ct. App.
1964).
14 2 HARPER & JAmES, ToRTs § 28.7 at 1548 (1956).
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Love therefore stands for the proposition that a warning, ade-
quate in itself, may be cancelled or withdrawn by subsequent ad-
vertising and promotion inconsistent with the original cautionary
statements.
II. BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
Although there appears to be a logical basis for imposing lia-
bility for breach of an implied warranty in this case, the court in
Love rejected this approach. Under the law in effect in California
at the time Love was decided, 15 an implied warranty that the drug
was of merchantable quality would have arisen from the sale by
Parke-Davis, a seller of goods of that description, of the drug chloro-
mycetin.16 This warranty would be in effect unless there was a
warning of the dangers involved. However, "an adequate warn-
ing of danger given to those normally expected to use a particular
drug absolves the manufacturer from any liability in warranty."'17
Thus, if Parke-Davis had given no warning of dangers inherent
in the use of chloromycetin, an implied warranty that the drug was
safe for use in the treatment of diseases would have existed. How-
ever, the court held in Love that the subsequent advertising and
promotion cancelled or withdrew the warning. The warning be-
ing cancelled and withdrawn, the implied warranty would presum-
ably still exist. Therefore, due to the negation of the warning,
breach of an implied warranty could arguably have been the basis of
the liability of Parke-Davis to the plaintiff.
The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted recently by
California.'8 Therefore, some consideration of the probable effects
of the Uniform Commercial Code warranty provisions upon a sit-
uation such as that in Love is necessary.
The concept of implied warranties of merchantability is greatly
expanded and clarified under section 2-314.19 It defines some of the
15 The Uniform Sales Act was the law in California until the Uniform
Commercial Code became effective Jan. 1, 1965.
16 UNIom SALES ACT § 15(2) provides: "Where the goods are bought
by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description
(whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an im-
plied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality."
17 Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 350, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 322, 328 (Ct. App. 1963). In Magee the drug manufacturer was
absolved from liability in an action for wrongful death resulting from
administration of its drug because a sufficient warning had been given
to the physician who had administered the drug to the decedent.
18 CAL. COMM. CODE §§ 1101 to 10104.
19 Section 2-314 provides: "(1) Unless excluded or modified (section
2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in
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meanings of merchantability, but as stated in comment 620 to that
section, it ". . . does not purport to exhaust the meaning of 'mer-
chantable' nor to negate any of its attributes not specifically men-
tioned in the text of the statute, but arising by usage of trade or
through case law."
In the fact situation existing in Love, Parke-Davis was a mer-
chant of goods of the kind sold. Therefore a warranty of mer-
chantability would be implied in the contract for the sale of chloro-
mycetin. In order for a drug of this nature to be merchantable, it
would have to be fit for the ordinary purposes for which drugs
are used. Such ordinary purpose would presumably be the contin-
ued administration of the drug until the condition being treated
was cured. If that is the case and chloromycetin was not fit for
that ordinary purpose, it appears that an action for breach of an
implied warranty of merchantability under section 2-314(2) (c)
could have arisen.
Section 2-31521 establishes implied warranties of fitness for a
particular purpose. If the drug was to be used for a specific pur-
pose different from the usual purpose for which such a drug would
be used, and Parke-Davis had reason to know of such a use, a
warranty under this section would arise. Such a particular purpose
a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food
or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract de-
scription; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agree-
ment may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316) other implied war-
ranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade." UNIFORM
ComnRaciAL CODE § 2-314.
20 UNIFom CoIvnvMaCIA CODE § 2-314, comment 6.
21 Section 2-315 provides: "Where the seller at the time of contracting
has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are
required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment
to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified
under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit
for such purposes." UNIFomw CoMvnERcIA CODE § 2-315.
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involving a drug of this nature might be its use in treating a disease
for which it would not usually be administered, or an unusually
prolonged duration of treatments with the drug. The meaning of
particular purpose is explained in comment 2 to section 2-315.22
Section 2-31623 is a new concept in statutory provisions regard-
ing warranties, and creates strict prerequisites for the effectiveness
of disclaimers. In order for an implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity to be excluded or modified under this section, "merchantability"
must be specifically mentioned.24 The cautionary statements given
by Parke-Davis, even if they would have satisfied the duty to warn,
would not have been sufficient to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability under this section because "merchant-
ability" was not specifically mentioned. In contrast to implied
warranties of merchantability, implied warranties of fitness for a
particular purpose may be excluded by general language, but it
must be in writing and conspicuous. 25
Section 2-31726 requires that any express or implied warranties
be construed as consistent and cumulative. In a situation such as
that in Love, any express warranties created by the advertising and
statements of the "detail" men and implied warranties of mer-
chantability and fitness for a particular purpose arising out of the
sale of the drug by Parke-Davis would be consistent with each
other and therefore cumulative in effect.
22 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, comment 2, states: "A 'particular
purpose' differs from the ordinary purpose for which the goods are
used in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar
to the nature of his business whereas the ordinary purposes for which
goods are used are those envisaged in the concept of merchantability
and go to uses which are customarily made of the goods in question.
For example, shoes are generally used for the purpose of walking upon
ordinary ground, but a seller may know that a particular pair was
selected to be used for climbing mountains."
23 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2) provides: "Subject to subsec-
tion (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability
or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in
case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and
conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is
sufficient if it states, for example, that 'There are no warranties which
extend beyond the description on the face hereof.'"
24 UN FoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, comment 3.
25 UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, comment 4.
26 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-317 provides, in part: 'Warranties
whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent with each
other and as cumulative, but if such construction is unreasonable the
intention of the parties shall determine which warranty is dominanf."
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III. STRICT LIABILITY
If the warning given was actually withdrawn or cancelled by
the subsequent promotional campaign, the court could very well
have imposed strict liability. Strict liability is liability without
fault for damage resulting from a defect in the product of which
the consumer is not aware.27  Strict liability is based on social
considerations which encourage manufacturers to exercise the
greatest care possible, and when a loss due to injury does occur its
burden is shifted from the injured plaintiff to those engaging in the
hazardous business. Strict liability is a reasonably recent develop-
ment in the law of products liability and has rapidly expanded in
recent years. 28
What constitutes a "defect" in a product justifying the imposi-
tion of strict liability? It has been suggested that the criterion
for establishing that an article is "defective" for purposes of strict
liability is synonymous with the criterion of merchantability set
forth in section 2-314(2) (c) of the Uniform Commercial Code.29
The Restatement of Torts indicates that strict liability would not
be imposed for injuries resulting from a useful but dangerous drug,
where proper directions had been given. "Such a product, properly
prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is
not defective .. ."30
Under the criterion of the Restatement, the injury resulting to
plaintiff Love would have been due to a defect in chloromycetin.
27 RESTATEVIENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402 A (1965), provides: "(1) One
who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller."
28 See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
29 See Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts
Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19
RUTGERS L. REv. 692, 700 (1965). UNIoFM Co nWERCIAL CODE § 2-314
is set forth in note 19, supra.
30 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 402 A, comment k at 353-54 (1965).
(Emphasis added.)
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The cancellation of the warning would render the dangers inherent
in the drug a defect, justifying the imposition of strict liability.
The California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prod., Inc.,3 1 declared that all that was necessary to establish the
liability of the manufacturer of a power tool was that the plaintiff
prove that he was using the product in a way in which it was in-
tended to be used and was injured as a result of a defect in design
and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware.3 2 The court in
Love stated that strict liability has not been applied to a failure
adequately to warn of the dangers inherent in the use of a drug.3
However, if strict liability has been imposed for injuries resulting
from defects unknown to the plaintiff in the case of a power tool,
there is no sound reason why the same rule should not apply in the
case of a drug, which comes into intimate bodily use. If, as the
Love court held, the subsequent advertising and promotional cam-
paign cancelled and negated the warning statements, the decision in
Greenman would have justified the imposition of strict liability
upon Parke-Davis.
IV. EXPRESS WARRANTY UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
In addition to the Code sections covering implied warranties,
the section covering express warranty may be applicable to a situa-
tion like that in Love and is therefore worthy of consideration.
Section 2-313(1) (a) 34 of the Code provides for the creation of
31 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). The plaintiff was
injured when a piece of wood he was working on flew out of a "Shop-
smith" electric power tool, which had been warranted to be safe. It
has been stated in 1 FRUmER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A (1),
at 442.1-42.2 (1964), that Greenman is the most important decision in
the area of products liability since Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), (disclaimer ineffective against
plaintiff injured by defect inherent in automobile purchased for her
by her husband), and perhaps the most important since MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), (privity of
contract between manufacturer of automobile and injured plaintiff not
essential to recovery).
32 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
33 Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 402, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 197-98 (Ct.
App. 1964).
34 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313(1) (a) provides: "(1) Express
warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
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express warranties by affirmation or promise. The Code does not,
however, require that these affirmations or promises be made di-
rectly to the plaintiff, or someone in privity with him. Comment 2
to section 2-31335 expressly provides that the question of privity is
left to the established and developing lines of case law. It would
therefore appear that a court, following the provisions of the Code,
could find a drug company liable to a patient for the breach of an
express warranty made directly to his doctor. In the case of a pre-
scription drug, it would be impossible to expect the warranty to
be made directly to the patient, as the patient usually does not
know what drug is prescribed nor the dangers inherent in its ad-
ministration. 6
Under section 2-313, the affirmations or promises must be
such as become part of the basis of the bargain. Comment 137 to
that section states that "'Express' warranties rest on 'dickered' as-
pects of the individual bargain. . . ." These "dickered" aspects are
elements of the negotiation leading to the contractual agreement.
Section 2-313(2)38 establishes that no particular language or
"words of art" are required to make an express warranty. In addi-
tion, the intent of the seller to make a warranty is not necessary.
The determination of what constitutes "puffing" is, as under the
previous law, left for the courts.
A feature of the express warranty under the Code which did
not exist under the previous law is that the precise time the af-
firmation or promise was made is not material. 9 Under the Code
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the affirmation or promise." This is comparable to UNIroFM SALEs
ACT § 12, which provides: "Any affirmation of fact or any promise
by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural
tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to
purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying
thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement
purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be con-
strued as a warranty."
5 UmFoRM CommcnAL CODE § 2-313, comment 2.
36 In the case of a prescription drug, a warning as well as a warranty,
as in Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 322 (Ct. App. 1963) is sufficient if given to the physician.
37 U Iromv CoMMEaciAL CODE § 2-313, comment 1.
38 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313(2) provides: "It is not necessary
to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words
such as 'warrant' or 'guarantee' or that he have a specific intention to
make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or com-
mendation of the goods does not create a warranty."
39 UEroam Co1MEIcIAL CODE § 2-313, comment 7.
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an additional assurance made to the buyer after the sale may still
constitute an express warranty. This section may have particular
relevance in a situation like the present if the advertisements or
statements of the "detail" men induced the doctors to administer
drugs which had been purchased previously. That the affirmations
or statements of fact came after the sale would not prevent the
creation of an express warranty.
The statements of the "detail" men of Parke-Davis as to the
safety of chloromycetin could be considered to be affirmations
forming part of the basis of the bargain under section 2-313(1) (a).
When dealing with physicians these statements could well be
included in the "dickered" aspects of the transaction. While Parke-
Davis solicited reliance upon their statements, they undoubtedly
had no intention to make an express warranty that chloromycetin
was absolutely safe. However, such intention is not required for
the creation of an express warranty, nor are such express words as
"warrant" or "guarantee."
In addition to the statements by the "detail" men, it is possible
to construe statements in advertising as affirmations constituting
express warranties under section 2-313. Statements in advertising
materials have been held to create express warranties in numerous
cases.
40
If Love were to be decided under the Code, it is likely that either
the statements by the "detail" men of Parke-Davis or those con-
tained in the advertising material, or both, would be held to con-
stitute express warranties, giving the plaintiff a cause of action un-
der the Code for the injury resulting from the breach.
V. CONCLUSION
The area of products liability has been rapidly expanding in
recent years. Included in this expansion has been an increasing
tendency to hold manufacturers liable to those injured by using
their products. This trend toward strict liability is thought to
cause the manufacturers to exercise greater care in their manufac-
turing processes and to shift the loss due to injury from the
injured party to those engaging in the business which has caused
the injury. This burden may then be shifted, by means of a com-
mensurate increase in the price of the product, to the consumers of
the product as a whole.
40 E.g., Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 30 Ohio Op. 2d 181, 197 N.E.2d
921 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964) af'd 3 Ohio St.2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294
(1961); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
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While the decision in Love reaches the same result, liability in a
case such as this need not be predicated upon the inadequacy of
warning or negligence in promotion. Liability in such a situation
should be based upon strict liability of the manufacturer or upon
breach of warranty, thereby eliminating the burden upon the plain-
tiff of proving negligence and placing an affirmative duty on the
manufacturer to assure that latent defects in their products will not
harm consumers. A decision on one of these bases would be more
consistent with the current trends in the law of products liability.
The most important aspect of the decision in Love is the hold-
ing that a subsequent advertising and promotional campaign may
cancel a warning that has been given of dangers inherent in a
product. This should serve as a caveat to manufacturers that when
they seek to induce the purchase of their products by means of
assurances of safety inconsistent with warnings which have been
given, the warnings may be cancelled.
Dennis C. Karnopp '67
